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We find
find strong evidence of
control by government
legislative agenda control
of monopoly legislative
parties in
parties have near-zero
roll
in the Bundestag. First, the government parties
parties
near—zero roll
rolled
rates, while the opposition parties
parties are often
rolled
over
half
the
time.
Second,
often
half
(and not
roll rates
only opposition parties’ (and
not government parties’) roll
rates increase with
the distances of
each
from
the
floor
median.
Third,
almost all
policy
all policy
party
of
from
oor
moves are towards the government coalition
coalition (the only exceptions occur during
during
periods of
for government parties
parties skydivided government). Fourth, roll
roll rates
rates for
periods
of divided
rocket when they fall
fall into
for opposition parties
parties
and roll
roll rates for
into the opposition and
plummet when they enter government, while policy movements
from being
being
plummet
movements go from
100 per
100 per
nearly 100
per cent rightward
per
is a rightist
rightward when there is
rightist government to 100
cent leftward
under
a
leftist
government.
leftward
leftist

INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

Governing
in parliamentary democracies are famous for their voting coheGoverning coalitions in
sion. Individual
Individual MPs
coalition partners
MPs rarely dissent from their party’s position,
position, coalition
rarely disagree publicly,
and the government’s programme
publicly, and
programme thus proceeds through the
assembly on
— simply outvoting
on the strength of the coalition’s numerical superiority –
the opposition at every turn.
Iron discipline, however,
natural phenomenon. The component parties in
however, is not a natural
Iron
in
multiparty coalitions do not agree on
possible issues;
issues; they merely agree on
all possible
on all
on all
assembly.11 Thus, the high
in plenary sessions of the assembly.
issues actually considered
considered in
high levels
of coalition
in roll
coalition discipline observed
observed in
roll call votes are as much
much a function of governmental agenda control –— specifically,
coalition to prevent bills that would
speci cally, the ability of the coalition
and
oor —
split its members apart from being
– as they are of the carrots and
on the floor
being voted on
sticks that governing parties use to whip their members into
line.22
into line.
Republic,33 the government’s ability to
In
such as France’s Fifth
Fifth Republic,
In some polities,
polities, such
control the legislative
institutional sources. In
In this article, we
legislative agenda has clear institutional
explore agenda setting in
in Germany,
in which the government’s institutional
institutional
Germany, a case in
control of the agenda might be questioned –— given
tradition of seeking broad
broad congiven the tradition
sensus in
institution in
Council of Elders (the formal agenda-setting
in the Council
in the Bundestag)
agenda-setting institution
and the frequency with which the government does not command
command a majority in
in the
Bundesrat). We argue that the Council
second
second chamber (the Bundesrat).
Elders seeks –— and
and is
Council of Elders
expected
– only a procedural and
and not a substantive consenexpected by the opposition
opposition to seek —
sus; that the government is relatively successful at patching
in the
patching together support in
Bundesrat;
Bundesrat; and thus, that the most likely impediments to governmental agenda
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in Germany are not serious in
in practice.
control in
practice. We then show that the actual plenary
in Germany is consistent with the notion
agenda in
notion that the governing coalition
coalition sets the
little more
observed in
more constraint than is observed
agenda, with little
in other parliamentary cases.
IN THE
THE BUNDESTAG
AGENDA CONTROL
BUNDESTAG44
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
CONTROL AND LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE IN

and other important
of ces proportionally
The Bundestag
Bundestag allocates committee chairs and
important offices
bonus, as is
coalition a bonus,
is common
among all parties, without giving the governing coalition
common in
in
many other systems. Moreover,
noted, the Council
and
Council of Elders seeks, and
Moreover, as already noted,
usually achieves, a consensus among all (or nearly all) parties regarding
regarding the plenary
agenda.55 ItIt is
agenda.
is rare
and such attempts
rare that parties seek to add items to the plenary agenda and
fail.66
almost always fail.
Council of Elders
Elders mean
mean the governDoes the apparent consensus achieved in
in the Council
avoid bills
bills the opposition
kind of universalism
universalism
ment must avoid
it imply a kind
opposition dislikes? Does it
in
bills onto the plenary agenda? In
in which shifting coalitions take turns pushing
In pracpushing bills
tice, as we shall see, it means neither of these things. The German
German government appears
is fiercely
willing and able to push
legislation that is
ercely opposed by the opposition.
push through legislation
make it
Moreover, the only important bills that make
Moreover,
it onto the plenary agenda are those supcoalitions, but by one particular majority coalition
ported, not by shifting majority coalitions,
coalition –—
that composed
composed of the governing parties.
parties.
How do governmental parties achieve agenda control given proportional allocation
of committee chairs and
formation?77 The answer is that governand ‘consensual’
‘consensual’ agenda formation?
mental parties control the agenda because:
mental

(1) They hold
hold a majority of seats in
and leadership
in all the core working and
leadership bodies of the
chamber, mainly the committees and
and the Council of Elders.
(2) The Council
aim for a consensus on
bills to
Council of Elders does not aim
on the substance of the bills
be considered
considered in
such bills
bills
on the details of how such
in the plenary session, but only on
debated and voted. The opposition
should be
be debated
opposition parties accept that the majority
should
should be
allowed to control
be allowed
control the substantive content of the bills that the government sends to the Bundestag. Their demands only concern their ability to criticise
such proposals effectively.
Elders are decided
decided by majority vote
(3) Challenges to the agenda set by the Council
Council of Elders
in
can implement any agreement they
in the Bundestag.
Bundestag. Thus, the government parties can
reach
reach among themselves regarding
should and
and should
should not appear on
on the
regarding what should
agenda, if
accord with the
Council of Elders act in
on the Council
if their representatives on
in accord
(and their rank and
coalition’s agreement (and
and file
le is willing to vote down attempts to
oor).
amend
amend the government’s agenda on the floor).
Government Majorities
Majorities
Regarding
possession of a majority on all committees and
and in
in the
Regarding the government’s possession
Council
Elders, the number of members from each
each parliamentary group on
Council of Elders,
on aa com(and each fraction has dismittee is proportional to the size of the parliamentary group (and
cretion
cretion over which of its members will sit on
on each committee). Thus, as long
long as
(which has always been
governmental parties maintain
in the Bundestag
maintain a majority in
been
Bundestag (which
the case), they have a majority on
each committee.
on each
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Committee chairs are allocated
allocated proportionally among all parties,
meaning that the
parties, meaning
government cannot always count on
however,
on a sympathetic chair. The Bundestag
Bundestag can, however,
weeks.88 Thus,
referred to it
compel a committee to report on any matters referred
it within ten weeks.
block, although
chairs by themselves cannot block,
although they may delay, the progress of
legislation.
The Council of Elders manages the internal
internal affairs of the Bundestag.
Bundestag. Some of the
most important agenda-setting functions of the Council
Council are: deciding the agenda for the
distribution of committee chairs and
and deputy chairs among
coming year, deciding
deciding the distribution
fractions,99 and
(the
each coming
and importantly deciding
fractions,
deciding the plenary agenda for each
coming week (the
items of business to be considered, whether there will be a debate, and
and the length
length
in this leadership
and structure of such a debate). The government has a majority in
10
and all other bodies
bodies of the chamber.
it has a majority on committees and
body,
chamber.”
body, just as it
The Meaning
Meaning of
of Consensus
third points made above, what of the long
Turning now to the second and third
long tradition of
11
seeking consensus in
Were this an ironclad
rule, it might imply
Elders?”
ironclad rule,
Council of Elders?
in the Council
that only bills approved
could reach
reach the plenary agenda. Our reading
reading of
approved by all parties could
the matter is that difficulty
in achieving substantive consensus on
merits of bills
bills
on the merits
dif culty in
led the Council to issue an
an
brought forward by the government in
in the early 1950s
1950s led
oor agenda by majority
added to the floor
1955, allowing items to be added
interpretation
in 1955,
interpretation in
12
believe, made
floor.”
vote on
This ruling,
made it
could
on the floor.
it clear that the government could
ruling, we believe,
get its way, so long
united, even without a consensus in
it was internally united,
in the
long as it
Council of Elders.
Elders. It,
reduced the scope of bargaining
bargaining within the Council.
It, therefore, reduced
Opposition
bills, but merely to
Opposition parties no longer sought to veto or delay government bills,
bills. Consensus in
Council
had a fair chance to criticise those bills.
ensure that they had
in the Council
thus implies only procedural
and not substantive agreement.
procedural and
Divided
Divided Government
One final
is lessened
lessened
nal question is whether the government’s ability to control the agenda is
13
when it
notes,
in the second chamber. As Patzelt
Patzeltl3
command a majority in
it does not command
‘govnotes, ‘govis quite common
common for German
erning without control of the Bundesrat is
German Chancellors’.
believe that divided
divided control
Moreover,
control of
in Germany believe
Moreover, many politicians and scholars in
the bicameral
bicameral German
is causing gridlock reminiscent of the kind
kind found
found
German parliament is
14,15
in
US.”’'5
in the US.
divided government has a statistically discernible, yet small,
We shall show that divided
and make
make policy.
on the government’s ability to control the agenda and
effect on
policy. The effect
is small because the government manages to secure the support of the Bundesrat
even
divided government, by buying
Lander delegations to
even during
during divided
buying off the votes of Länder
whom it allocates funds in
in exchange for their support.
THE PROCEDURAL
PROCEDURAL CARTEL THESIS

Agenda Cartels
In
In all democratic national
national assemblies of which we are aware, there are certain
certain offices
of ces to
which special agenda powers attach. Only the speaker of the US
House of
US House
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Representatives,
rules.
recognition for motions to suspend
Representatives, for example, can grant recognition
suspend the rules.
in the UK.
Only ministers of the Crown
Crown can
German
UK. Only the German
can propose new taxes in
Council of Elders can advise the president regarding
Council
regarding the plenary agenda.
First,
de ne an agenda cartel as a set of agents possessing
We define
possessing two key properties.
properties. First,
in the assembly.
they collectively hold
hold a controlling
of ces in
controlling share of the agenda-setting
agenda—setting offices
Thus, just as an economic cartel collectively monopolises an economic resource,
resource, such
as steel, so too does an agenda cartel collectively monopolise a legislative
legislative resource,
resource,
of ces. Second, the cartel establishes a procedure
agenda-setting
agenda—setting offices.
scheduling propoprocedure for scheduling
decentralised or centralised, formal or inforsals for plenary debate and vote. Whether decentralised
mal, this procedure amounts to investing
mal,
labeled C
investing kk groups within the cartel, labeled
C1,
Ck,
1, .. .. .. ,,C
k,
with vetoes over the placement of proposals upon
upon the plenary agenda.
One subspecies of agenda cartel –— which we call a parliamentary agenda cartel –— is
said that each
often said
each pivotal
concern here. In
it is often
of particular concern
pivotal
In parliamentary systems, it
16
veto.1°
coalition wields an agenda veto.
party in
In
in a multi-party majority coalition
In this case, the
groups C
. ,, C
in govC1,
pivotal parties in
correspond to the pivotal
Ckk that wield agenda vetoes correspond
1, .....
In Germany, there is strong evidence that coalition partners
ernment. In
have important
partners have
veto powers that are often formalised
between parties: ‘.‘. .... a
formalised by written agreements between
formal coalition
is signed prior to the Chancellor’s election by the
coalition agreement
agreement.. . ..is
Bundestag. In
coalition agreement it
no decisions in
it is stipulated
In the present coalition
in
stipulated that no
the Bundestag
is, those forged
Bundestag shall be taken with ‘changing
‘changing majorities’ –— that is,
through the inclusion
inclusion of votes from the opposition. This clause endows minority
groups of both
both parties,
and of course the junior coalition
coalition partner as a whole, with
parties, and
17,18
making.17’18
intra-coalition policy making.
absolute veto power in
in intra-coalition
The Cartel
Cartel Thesis
The procedural
it will
if a majority government forms, then it
procedural cartel thesis stipulates that, if
19
also constitute an agenda cartel.
For present purposes,
cartel.”
purposes, we advance this thesis simply
as an empirical generalisation
be tested, rather than deriving it
conclusion from
generalisation to be
it as a conclusion
more primitive assumptions. This thesis is thus similar to Gamson’s Law —
– the obsereach
vation that, if
if a multi-party government forms in
in a parliamentary system, then each
20
assembly.”
party’s share of portfolios will closely reflect
re ect its share of seats in
in the assembly.
(the
Both
claim that agenda vetoes are distributed
distributed to each
Both the claim
each pivotal
pivotal party (the
parliamentary cartel thesis) and
and the claim
claim that portfolios in
in parliamentary systems
are distributed
distributed proportionally to seat shares (Gamson’s Law) characterise the government bargaining
bargaining outcomes that emerge in
in equilibrium. Theoretical models of the
government formation process should then accommodate these empirical regularities,
regularities,
to the extent that they are empirically validated. A primary purpose
purpose of this article is to
see how well the procedural cartel thesis applies to the German
German case.
TESTING
TESTING THE PROCEDURAL
CARTEL THESIS
PROCEDURAL CARTEL

Many studies of the legislative
legislative success of parliamentary governments examine the
21
pass.”
proportion
Here,
introduced by the government that pass.
roll
Here, we examine roll
proportion of bills introduced
rates,
if a majority of a party’s voting
rates, rather than success rates. Operationally, if
members votes against a bill
bill that nonetheless passes, we say that the party has been
been
rolled. Think of a legislative
train leaving
and a party that has tried to
legislative train
leaving the station and
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stop it
been run
roll rate
run over. What one expects the roll
governing party to be
rate of a governing
it –— but has been
depends on how one thinks the legislative
legislative agenda is determined.
The Floor
Model
Floor Agenda Model
Suppose there is no agenda cartel and
and the plenary agenda is set by motions made and
and
If we
voted on the floor,
oor, with all parties having
such motions.
motions. If
having equal chances to bring
bring such
Floor
assume that all parties can be placed
– right scale, then this Floor
along a traditional left
left—right
placed along
median party is
is never rolled,
Model leads to a very simple expectation: the median
rolled,
Agenda Model
roll rates increase monotonically both
both to the left and
and to the right of the
while roll
median,
median, regardless of government status.
The intuition
intuition behind
behind this result is straightforward. The median
median party cannot be
rolled because it
move policy away
it is not possible to form a majority that wants to move
rolled
median in
unidimensional model. That roll
increase to either side of
roll rates increase
from the median
in a unidimensional
median, F,
the median,
be illustrated
illustrated by imagining
can be
F, can
imagining that a particular status quo policy,
policy,
Q1, lies between
between two right-wing
ideal points and
and that a bill
bill proposing
right—wing parties’ ideal
proposing to
22
1).”
(R2 in
in
move policy leftward
The more
leftward is passed
more extreme party (R2
Figure 1).
passed (see Figure
1) will necessarily vote against the bill,
Figure
bill, as the bill
bill will move policy farther
Figure 1)
(R1
ideal point;
from R2’s ideal
it will be rolled.
away from
rolled. The more moderate party (R1
point; hence, it
1) may in
in
bill, if
ideal point,
R1,
it is closer to the party’s ideal
in Figure
in fact vote for the bill,
if it
Figure 1)
point, R1,
1), the moderate party is
than is the status quo. In
is not
In this case (pictured
in Figure
Figure 1),
(pictured in
rolled. Generalising
roll rate
rate of the more
Generalising this example, one can show that the roll
extreme party must be at least as high
moderate party –— and
and this
high as that of the more moderate
and policies to the left of the median
median party (for example, for
is true for parties and
and L2,
and status quo, Q2) as well.
parties L1
L2, and
L1 and
F
I G U R E 11
FIGURE
THEOREM)
T
HE F
LOOR A
GENDA M
O D E L ((MEDIAN
MEDIAN V
OTER T
HEOREM) A
ND R
OLL R
ATES
THE
AND
AGENDA
RATES
FLOOR
MODEL
VOTER
ROLL
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If there is
Thus, we have a general test for the absence of an
is a clear
an agenda cartel. If
in party rolls,
V-shaped
–right spectrum, then there
rolls, viewed across the left
left—right
V—shaped pattern
pattern in
cannot be an agenda cartel.
The Cartel
Model
Cartel Agenda Model
If there is an agenda cartel (meaning
If
facto
(meaning each pivotal government party wields a de facto
then
oor that any governing party then
veto), we should not see legislation
legislation reaching
reaching the floor
For, any pivotal
unsuccessfully opposes. For,
being
pivotal governing party that anticipates being
rolled
rolled on
bill should
should exercise its veto to prevent the bills
bills appearance on
on a particular bill
on
the plenary agenda.
in Figure
Consider, as an example, the uni-dimensional
uni—dimensional policy space in
Figure 2. The governMand
F is also the median
ment consists of two parties,
ideal points M
and F.
median party
parties, with ideal
F. Party F
is the ideal
ideal point of a party in
in
in the assembly as a whole. The point m
m is
in the opposition.
Model predicts that the government will only schedule for a
The Cartel Agenda Model
vote those bills that ultimately (after any floor
oor amendments) move policy closer to
M and
If the status quo is
M than is F
F–
— as is
in Figure
both
SQ]1 in
both M
and F. If
is closer to M
is SQ
Figure 2 –—
then no bill
bill to change policy will be
be presented
presented to the chamber by the government.
bill changing a status quo policy like
like SQ11
This is because M
M will anticipate that, if
if a bill
oor, then the bill
bill will pass if
allowed onto the floor,
and only if
toward
is allowed
it moves policy toward
if and
if it
F
F and away from M.
M. Thus, as shown in
in Figure
Figure 2, all proposals to change status quo
[2M—F, F] will be
points lying
be blocked
blocked by the government (pursuant to
in the set [2M-F,
lying in
23
M).23
demands made
Thus, we have
made by M).
have the following hypothesis:
HI)
roll rate
rate of
H1) Under
Under complete information
information24with costless gatekeeping, the roll
of
governmental
parties will
governmental parties
will be zero.
zero.24
F
IGURE 2
FIGURE
A
GENDA C
ONTROL M
ODEL F
OR T
HE B
UNDESTAG
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BUNDESTAG
CONTROL
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The opposition (or minority) party,
be rolled
rolled –— every time the
party, by contrast, will be
in the opposition
F and
status quo lies in
is, the interval
roll zone, that is,
interval between
between F
and 2m-F.
opposition roll
oor, will pass,
such as SQ
be brought to the floor,
Thus, bills to change status quos such
SQ22 will be
and will thus roll
roll party m. This logic leads to the roll
roll rates described
described in
and
in Figure
Figure 3 and
to our second
second hypothesis:
H2) The roll
parties should
roll rate of
should be higher
roll rate of
higher than the roll
oppositionparties
of opposition
of governmental parties.
ernmental

(the leftmost
bill onto the agenda when M
Because the government will not allow any bill
Because
M (the
(the floor
median), the
member of the governing coalition) prefers the status quo to F
oor median),
F (the
Mand F
Fshould
in M
M
distance between
between M
should not affect the government’s roll
roll rate
rate (decreases in
stretch the blockout zone leftward
leftward and the government will still block all promerely stretch
[2M-F, F]).
F]). In
roll
posals to change status quos within [2M-F,
In contrast, an opposition
opposition party’s roll
increases, 2m-F
rate will be
related to the distance between
and F
be positively related
between m
m and
F (as m
m increases,
increases,
increases, stretching the minority party roll
roll zone). Moreover,
Moreover, as an opposition
opposition party’s
(the position
F (the
distance from F
increases, so should
median voter) increases,
should its
its roll
roll rate.
rate.
position of the median
Thus:
H3) The roll
farther its
roll rate of
should increase the farther
median
its median
opposition party should
of an opposition
(In) is
|m-F|,
ideal
point (m)
from the floor
median
(F).
That
is,
the
greater
jm-Fj,
the
ideal point
median
is from
oor
greater an opposition party
party’s
roll rate, all
all else constant.
’s roll

To see how agenda-setting
can affect legislative outcomes, imagine
agenda—setting power can
imagine aa newly
elected legislature
could label
label each
each one
elected
legislature and the set of existing
existing government policies (we could
Each of these policies could
could in
SQ11,, SQ
it faces. Each
in Figure
in principle
Figure 2) that it
principle
SQ2,
,SQ,,n as in
2, . .. . ,SQ
F
IGURE 3
FIGURE
C
ARTEL A
GENDA M
ODEL A
ND R
OLL R
ATES
AND
CARTEL
AGENDA
RATES
MODEL
ROLL
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be adjusted, sliding them further to the left or right (for example, less generous or more
bene ts). The newly elected
generous unemployment benefits).
elected members and
and their parties have
should be
be positioned
opinions regarding
regarding how each of the nn policies
along their
policies ideally should
positioned along
respective left
–right dimensions. Denote
median
Denote the centre of legislative
legislative opinion
left—right
opinion (the median
(one
ideal position) regarding
,
.
.
.
,F
for
the
n
policies
(one
such
policy
is
regarding each policy by F
...
n
,F,,
F1,
1
n
in Figure
depicted
Figure 2).
depicted in
main categories, depending
One can divide existing government policies into two main
median (F
between the legislative
and
on the relationship
)
and
the status quo (SQ
In one
legislative median
relationship between
(F1-)
(SQJ-).
j
j). In
lie to the left of the current centre of legislative
category are policies that lie
legislative opinion
opinion
(SQ
from the status quo (for
If the legislature votes to change such a policy from
(SQjj ,
< FFj).
j). If
in Figure
in Figure
example, SQ
median (for example, F in
oor median
Figure 2) to the floor
Figure 2), the
SQ,1 in
25
second main
main category are policies
result will be a rightward
In
In the second
move.25
rightward policy move.
policies
(SQjj .
lie to the right of the current centre of legislative
that lie
If the legislegislative opinion
opinion (SQ
>F
Fj).
j). If
bill to change such a policy from
from the status quo (for example, SQ
lature votes on
on a bill
in
SQ22 in
(F),
Figure
), the result will be
median (F
be a leftward
oor median
Figure 2) to the floor
leftward policy move.
It
and roll zones that, leftist governments,
It follows from our analysis of blockout and
in Figure
such as depicted
is, most policy
leftward. That is,
Figure 2, move most policies leftward.
depicted in
changes will change status quos such as SQ
moves within
Rightward policy moves
F. Rightward
SQ22 to F.
the blockout zone will be vetoed by the government. Some rightward
rightward policy moves
will be possible, changing status quos to the left of 2M-F
2M—F in
in Figure
F. In
In these
Figure 2 to F.
if not unanimous coalitions to be
in favour of the moves,
cases, we expect large,
be in
large, if
moves,
making
both the government and opposition
making both
opposition parties better off. Thus, the only exceptions to the rule that leftist governments will move policy leftward
should be combined
combined
leftward should
should
with large, if
if not unanimous,
unanimous, votes. Similarly,
Similarly, most rightist party policy moves should
26
unanimous.26
be rightward
Thus:
rightward or nearly unanimous.
H4) Policy should
should usually move leftward
and
leftward ifif the government isis left-of-centre
left—of—centre and
rightward
the
government
is
right-of-centre.
Changes
in
government
will,
all
all
is
rightward if
right—of—centre.
in
if
else constant, change the direction
movement.
direction of
policy
of
This result may seem
holds, then
notice that, if
Model holds,
seem obvious, but notice
if the Floor Agenda Model
policy moves will come from both
both directions, as shifting
and agree to
shifting coalitions form and
if the government forms an agenda cartel, and
move policy. It
and thereby agrees to
It is only if
avoid
avoid shifting coalitions, that a strong association
association between
between the political
political cast of the government and the direction
direction of policy movement is
is to be
be expected. Thus, examining
roll
examining roll
rates provides an appropriate test of whether the prohibition
on ‘changing
prohibition on
‘changing majorities’ to
which Germany’s governing parties typically agree is
is binding
in practice.
binding in
HYPOTHESES
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
HYPOTHESES ABOUT DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT

In
divided government (that
Inthis section, we state several hypotheses about the effect of divided
is,
is, divided
divided control of the Bundestag
and Bundesrat) in
in Germany. If
If an opposition
Bundestag and
opposition party
wields a veto in
and the second
second chamber can
rst-chamber
can block first-chamber
in the second chamber, and
proposals, then the party can use its veto to stop proposals that would roll
roll it.
it. If
If the
second
second chamber holds only a dilatory or suspensory veto, the majority coalition
coalition
there can
and may,
can use it
it to delay the government’s enactments and
may, by threatening to
delay, extract concessions from
coalition
from the government. In
In this way, the majority coalition
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in the Bundesrat can reduce the offensiveness of some of the government’s proposals
in
in the Bundestag.
and by so doing reduce the roll
roll rates of their comrades in
Bundestag. Thus:
H5) Divided
Divided government should
should decrease the roll
roll rates of
parties that
of opposition parties
hold
hold a veto in
in the other chamber (for example, when they are in
in the majority in
in
the other chamber), all
all else constant.
H6) We should
should see more unanimous
divided
unanimous or nearly unanimous votes during
during divided
all else constant.
government, all

coalition in
bicameral legislature
can place
on the
If
If the majority coalition
in chamber A of a bicameral
legislature can
place items on
agenda of chamber B,
divided government should
should lead
lead to a loss of agenda control
B, then divided
in chamber B.
in
blocked by the government or
Proposals that would otherwise be blocked
B. Proposals
could roll
roll the majority or govmajority in
in chamber B
B will get some plenary time and could
is equivalent to a change in
rst stage of the
ernment parties. This is
in the structure of the first
described in
game described
in the earlier section, whereby the government or majority parties no
longer have
Instead, some fraction of the agenda is conhave a monopoly on the agenda. Instead,
in the other
trolled by another party. Also, the opposition
opposition may use its power in
chamber, either through gatekeeping or proposing,
proposing, to create a bargain,
bargain, or logroll,
logroll,
with the majority or governmental parties. This bargain
include placing
bargain may include
placing items
in
end up rolling
in the agenda that end
rolling the government or majority parties and/or
moving
and/ or moving
policy away from the government/majority.
government/majority. Thus:
H7) Divided
Divided government should, all
all else constant, increase the roll
roll rates
rates of
of governmental
ernmental parties.
H8) Divided
should reduce the proportion
Divided government should
proportion of
proposals that move
of proposals
points of
the
government
all
else constant.
toward the ideal
ideal points
all
policy toward
parties,
of

DATA

We test these hypotheses using
in the Bundestag
roll call votes recorded
recorded in
between 1980
1980
using roll
Bundestag between
27
28
Wahlpers.28
periods,”
and 2002 for six legislative
namely the ninth
ninth through
legislative periods,
through fourteenth Wahlpers.
Recorded
Recorded votes take place when a parliamentary group or 31
them
31 members request them
and they usually concern hotly debated
debated issues of major policy.
There were 701 recorded
recorded votes during from
1980 to 2002 (excluding
from 1980
con dence
(excluding confidence
motions,
motions, veto overrides, and constitutional amendments, which require
require more than a
roll call votes on
bills
nal passage roll
simple majority of votes) and of these, 259 were final
on bills
and committee recommendations.
recommendations. It
from these final
nal passage
It is from
passage votes that we calculate
29
each party’s roll
moves.”
roll rate and the direction
direction of policy moves.
Party j is rolled
rolled if
and only if
its members vote ‘no’
motion to pass a
‘no’ on
more of its
on the motion
if and
if more
30
passes.30
bill
Party j’s
j’s roll
bill than vote ‘yes’
and the bill
bill passes.
roll rate
is simply the total number of
rate is
‘yes’ and
times it is rolled
rolled in
divided by the total number of votes held
held in
in a given time period, divided
in that
period.
In
roll rates, and
and later policy moves,
moves, a question
In calculating
calculating roll
question arises about the time
period
natural and
and
period to use. Calculating
Calculating these measures for each Wahlper would seem natural
most of our results are presented
is, however,
however, that multiple
presented on this basis. The problem
problem is,
multiple
Land
Land elections take place during any given
given Wahlper, which are usually seen as tests of
the federal government’s popularity.
held
popularity. These elections change the number of seats held
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in the Bundesrat. These changes frequently
by the federal government and
and opposition
opposition in
affect whether the government faces unified
divided control
control of the Bundesrat.
Bundesrat.
uni ed or divided
addition of new
have also resulted
resulted from the addition
Changes in
in Bundesrat representation
representation have
1990, by incorporating
Länder.
Lander. In
German unification
uni cation in
ve eastern
eastern
In particular,
in 1990,
incorporating five
particular, German
31
Länder,
Therefore, each time the
Lander, altered
Bundesrat.“
altered the political character of the Bundesrat.
in the Bundesrat,
balance of power between
Bundesrat, we
between government and
and opposition
opposition changes in
each party and
and its
its roll
roll rate. We call
call these time
can have a new observation for each
can
32
periods.32
periods legislative
Thus, the dependent variable in
in the following analysis
legislative sub periods.
each party during
roll rate of each
is either the roll
ninth to fourteenth Wahlpers, in
in
during each of the ninth
which case we have
roll rate
each party during
have 26 party-Wahlper
rate of each
party—Wah1per observations, or the roll
in which case we have 78 party-sub-period
each legislative
legislative sub-period, in
party-sub—period observations.
ve parties in
There are five
in the Bundestag
Christian
Bundestag during this period,
period, namely the Christian
(FDP), the Social DemoUnion (CDU/CSU),
Free Democratic Party (FDP),
Democratic Union
(CDU/CSU), the Free
(GRN), and
Socialism
and the Party of Democratic Socialism
cratic Party (SPD), the Green
Green Party (GRN),
(PDS). The PDS,
1990, with the
PDS, as the successor to the SED,
SED, came into
into existence in
in 1990,
unification
and Eastern
uni cation of Western and
Eastern Germany. The Greens gained
gained representation
representation starting
ing with the tenth Wahlper.
During
FDP began
in government. In
In our analysis,
and FDP
During the ninth
began in
ninth Wahlper, SPD and
(called Wahlper 9.1),
9.1), before
Wahlper 9 includes only the SPD —
– FDP
before
FDP government (called
the change in
and
FDP
took
1982, when CDU/CSU
and
in government that took place
in 1982,
FDP
place in
CDU/CSU
over (there were only four votes during this second
second part of the Wahlper, not enough
to create a Wahlper 9.2 for analysis). During
13, CDU/CSU
10-13,
and
During legislatures 10–
CDU/CSU and
constituted the government. With the fourteenth Wahlper, the SPD
and Greens
FDP
FDP constituted
SPD and
33
government.”
formed the new government.

BASIC
BASIC RESULTS
RESULTS

Hypotheses
H1 and
H2
and H2
Hypotheses HI
Roll
in the Bundestag
in
Roll rates for the government and
and opposition parties in
Bundestag are given in
column 3 in
be seen, the government parties’ roll
roll rate averages
column
in Table 1.
1. As can be
about 11 per cent. This average is
is substantively very close to zero and
is on
and is
on par with
T
A B L E 11
TABLE
M
EAN B
UNDESTAG R
OLL R
ATES F
OR G
OVERNMENT A
ND O
PPOSITION P
ARTIES W
H E N IIN
N
MEAN
AND
WHEN
BUNDESTAG
RATES
PARTIES
ROLL
FOR
GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION
M
INORITY V
S . IIN
N M
A J O R I T Y IIN
N T
HE B
UNDESRAT
VS.
BUNDESRAT
MINORITY
MAJORITY
THE

Party in
in Bundesrat
Bundesrat

Party in
in Bundestag
Bundestag

Out of government
In
In government

In
In minority

In
In majority

Mean
Mean roll
roll rates
rates

0.81
0.81
(0.14)
9 observations
0.02
(0.03)
12
12 observations

0.66
(0.14)
16
16 observations
0
(0)
8 observations

0.72
(0.15)
25 observations
0.01
0.01
(0.02)
20 observations

Note: only trends with eight or more final
in this analysis. Cell entries give means,
included in
nal passage votes included
means,
(in parentheses),
standard
standard deviations (in
parentheses), and the number of observations.
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in parliaments around
the roll
roll rates of other government parties in
around the world. Further
Further
analysis shows that the government’s rolls occurred
occurred only during divided
divided government
roll rate
on substantively unimportant issues, so the consequential roll
rate for the
and were on
34
zero.34
government is virtually zero.
in some rare
As a rule,
rule, governmental parties vote together; in
instances, however,
however, one
rare instances,
Inthe twelfth Wahlper, during
partner gets rolled
while the other does not.
rolledwhile
and
CDU and
during the CDU
not. In
rolled while FDP
did not,
abortion policy issues. In
on two abortion
FDP
FDP government, CDU
FDP did
In
CDU got rolled
not, on
coalition partner. In
on its coalition
these instances, FDP
FDP voted with the opposition, defecting
Inthe
defecting on
reform, where FDP
thirteenth Wahlper, there was one vote, on
rolled
on parliamentary reform,
thirteenth
FDP was rolled
and CDU
and in
issue of
CDU was not,
on the issue
in the fourteenth Wahlper, there was one vote, on
not, and
embryonic cell research, where the Greens were rolled
rolled but SPD
SPD was not.
not.
roll rates for government parties mean?
mean? Thinking
What do these low roll
Thinking not just of
roll rates mean
mean
Germany, but of governments/majorities
in general, low government roll
governments/ majorities in
either that the government has structural advantages in
in setting the agenda; or that
the governing coalition
coalition votes cohesively on agenda-setting
agenda—setting votes; or both. The mix
of structural advantage and
and disciplined
For
disciplined voting can vary from case to case. For
in the US House
example, the majority party in
relies less on strict disHouse of Representatives
Representatives relies
cipline and more on structural advantages than does the governing majority in
in the
Bundestag. US majorities take all committee chairs, whereas German
German majorities take
only a proportional
and US majorities take a super-proportional share of seats
proportional share; and
on the Rules Committee,
Committee, whereas German
German majorities
majorities take only a proportional share
of seats on the Council of Elders;
in the US House
Elders; amendments to bills in
roll the
often roll
House often
35
Bundestag.”
is never rolled
rolled on
on amendments in
majority party,
in the Bundestag.
party, but the government is
and
on discipline and
Although it is true that German
German majorities rely relatively more on
less on structural advantages than do majorities in
House, we would stress
in the US House,
(in the Council
that negotiating
oor (in
Council of Elders and,
negotiating the plenary agenda off the floor
before that, in
in talks among the governing partners) makes it
it easier to manage
manage the
constructed on
on the
agenda than would a system
in which the agenda were routinely constructed
system in
oor, as the latter system
motion can
floor,
can
opposition motion
system presents a greater risk that a clever opposition
divide the government. If,
If, for example, one coalition
coalition partner champions farmers’ subsidies but has agreed
it will not
agreed not to pursue increases during
during the current government, it
be happy to be forced
motions, introduced
introduced by a mischievous
forced repeatedly to vote down motions,
opposition, to consider such subsidies. Lessening
Lessening the opposition’s opportunities to
force votes on such mischievous motions is
is one advantage of endowing
like
endowing bodies like
the Council of Elders with agenda-setting
agenda—setting authority.
For the opposition
roll rate is much
much higher,
72 per cent. A
higher, at 72
opposition parties, the average roll
large part of these opposition rolls are votes on yearly budgets,
on major
budgets, but also on
(human rights policy),
policy areas such as tax laws,
laws, civil rights (human
reduction and
and relocapolicy), reduction
tion of troops and UN
and urban
urban affairs, labour
UN army participation,
regional planning
planning and
participation, regional
market policy,
and state expenditure, nursing
policy, social security, economic growth
nursing care,
growth and
abortion
regulation, environmental issues, agriculture, immigration,
abortion regulation,
health insurance
immigration, health
reform,
reform, privatisation
and pension
privatisation and
pension reform.

Hypothesis
H3
Hypothesis H3
In
In order to test hypothesis H3,
H3, we first
needed to estimate the distance of opposition
rst needed
opposition
(and governmental) parties from
(and
–right policy dimension.
median on
from the chamber median
on a left
left—right
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However,
ideological distance that has interval
However, because we do not have a measure of ideological
36
level
for the ninth
al.36
level properties,
used data from
from Budge
fourteenth
Budge et al.
ninth to fourteenth
properties, we have used
(both on the left and
and on
from
on the right) from
Wahlpers to identify the party farthest away (both
the government coalition
coalition in
in each Wahlper. We call these variables DISTANCE-L
jt
DISTANCE-LJ-t
37
party).37
(for the farthest left party) and
We
and DISTANCE-R
DISTANCE—RJ-tjt (for the farthest right party).
also estimate the distance of governmental parties from the chamber median
median
and
coef
cient
on
(DISTANCE_GOVT
),
and
we
expect
to
see
a
coefficient
on
this
variable
that
is not
(DISTANCE_GOVT]-l),
jt
38
from 0.
significantly
0.38
signi cantly different from
roll rates vary as a function of being
and out of
For a visual representation
in and
being in
representation of how roll
government in
–
and as a function of the parties’ placement on
lefton the left
in the Bundestag
Bundestag and
12 and 13
in Figures 4 and
right axis, we graph Wahlpers 12
and 5. Parties are ranked
ranked accord13 in
39
Manifesto Party Project
ing
–right score assigned in
in the Manifesto
al.39
er al.
ing to the left
Project by Budge
Budge et
left—right
X-axis, while roll
is shown on the x-axis,
roll
This variable, which we refer to as the MPP
MPP score, is
40
y-axis.4°
from 00 to 1,
rates,
on the y-axis.
1, are on
rates, varying from
These graphs illustrate
illustrate visually the results we find
nd in
in the following regression,
regression,
namely that government roll
0, that opposition
roll rates are not significantly
signi cantly different from 0,
roll
roll rates are significantly
and that roll
roll rates of opposition
signi cantly different from 0, and
opposition parties
increase the further away the party is from the governmental coalition
coalition median.
median. The
one deviation
deviation from
increase the further
from the finding
roll rates increase
nding that opposition
opposition parties’ roll
away they are from the left of the government is found in
in Wahlper 12
12 (Figure
(Figure 4).
The SPD has a lower roll
roll rate here because the opposition outnumbers the government
in
in the Bundesrat during this period
divided government.
period of divided
and their statistical significance
con rmed in
These graphic results and
in the
signi cance are confirmed
roll rate of party j during
regression
regression below. We regressed
ROLL RATE
regressed ROLL
RATEjt,
jt, the roll
F
IGURE 4
FIGURE
W
A H L P E R 1l2
2 R
OLL R
ATES O
F G
OVERNMENT A
ND O
PPOSITION P
ARTIES, B
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PP S
CORE
RATES
ROLL
OF
GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION
SCORE
WAHLPER
AND
BY
MPP
PARTIES,
GOVERNMENT)
((FDP
FDP A
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OVERNMENT)
AND
CDU
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FIGURE
F
IGURE 5
WAI-ILPER
AND
BY
MPP
W
A H L P E R 113
3 R
OLL R
ATES O
F G
OVERNMENT A
ND O
PPOSITION P
ARTIES, B
Y M
PP S
CORE
PARTIES,
RATES
ROLL
OF
GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION
SCORE
GOVERNMENT)
((FDP
FDP A
ND C
DU G
OVERNMENT)
CDU
AND

Wahlper t, on
DISTANCE-L
on IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAGJ-I,
jt,
jt,
DISTANCE—RJ-,3
DISTANCE—LJ-Ljt, DISTANCE-R
DISTANCE-GOVT
downward
TRENDjt,
jt, the last variable to account for the downward
DISTANCE—GOVTJ-tjt and TREND
41
period.“
trend evident in
This gives
in German
roll rates for all parties over this time period.
German roll
us equation
equation (1):
:
RATEjt ¼
a
ROLL
ROLL RATE
0L þ
1 IN GOVT BUNDESTAGjt
+ bB1IN_GovT,BUNDEsTAGj.
þ
2 DISTANCE-Ljt þ
3 DISTANCE-Rjt
+ bB2DISTANCE—LJ-t
+ bB3DISTANCE—RJ-t

þ
jt ,
4 DISTANCE-GOVTjt þ
5 TRENDjt þ
+ bB4DISTANCE—GOVTJ-t
+ bBSTRENDJ,
+ 1Sjt,

(1)

To estimate this equation, we employed
extended beta
beta binomial
binomial regression
method
employed the extended
regression method
42
43
Palmquist,43
King“
(EBB) suggested by King
and
which deals with situations where the
and Palmquist,
individual binary choices that are likely not
dependent variable is an aggregation
aggregation of individual
44
other.44
independent of each other.
The results in
in Table 2 show that, as hypothesised,
hypothesised, the
opposition
roll
from the government exhibits a significantly
signi cantly higher roll
opposition party farthest left from
rate than the opposition parties closer to the government. Again, the one deviation
from the finding
roll rates increase
increase as they are further away
nding that opposition parties’ roll
to the left of the government is
is to be found during
divided government in
in Wahlper 12.
12.
during divided
The coefficient
is, there was
coef cient on
on the variable DISTANCE-R
signi cant. That is,
DISTANCE-Rjtjt is not significant.
no difference in
roll rates for the two opposition
and FDP,
CDU and
FDP, in
in the roll
in the
opposition parties,
parties, CDU
(in which the SPD and
fourteenth Wahlper (in
and Greens formed
formed the government).
The variable that distinguishes the distance of governmental parties from the
chamber median
median (DISTANCE_GOVT
(DISTANCE_GOVTjt),
jt), as expected, is not statistically different
than zero. We can also reject the null
null hypothesis that the effect of distance from the

102
102
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644

GERMAN
GERMAN POLITICS
POLITICS
T
ABLE 2
TABLE
BY
PARTY-WAHLPER
AND
R
OLL R
ATES B
Y P
ARTY-WAHLPER F
OR G
OVERNMENT A
ND O
PPOSITION
RATES
ROLL
FOR
GOVERNMENT
OPPOSITION
PARTIES,
P
ARTIES, E
STIMATED B
Y E
BB
ESTIMATED
BY
EBB

Dependent variable: party j’s roll
in Wahlper t
roll rate
rate in
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAGJ-t
IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG
jt

Coefficient
(std. error)
(std.
Z statistic
— 5.072
25.072
(.551)

2 9.20
9'20>l<**
.738
(.229)

3.21
3.21***
— .267
2.267
(.37)
— .72
2
.72
.075
(.842)
.09
.09
— .084
2.084
(.021)

2 3.99
3.99>l<>l<*
1.818
1.818
(.318)

5.71***
5.71
740.21
740.21
23
7

DISTANCE-L
DlSTANCE—Lj,
jt
ranked furthest to the left from
from government in
(Opposition
in each
(Opposition party ranked
:11.)
Wahlper, by Budge et
er al.)
DISTANCE-R
DISTANCE—RJ-Ijt
in
(Opposition
(Opposition party ranked
ranked furthest to the right from government in
each Wahlper, by Budge
Budge et al.)
DISTANCE-GOVT
DISTANCE—GOVT»,
jt
(Non—median government party in
each Wahlper, by Budge
(Non-median
in each
Budge et
er al.)

government

TREND
TREND],jt
(Wahlper)
Constant
LR Chi
Chiz2
N
N


1-tailed test
.05; 
.01, 1-tailed
p,
p,
** indicates p
*** indicates p
< .05;
< .01,

chamber median
median on
roll rates for opposition
on the roll
opposition parties is 00 or negative. These results
in
serve to validate the key test of our theory, which is the comparative static presented
presented in
hypothesis H3.
H3.

Hypothesis
H4
Hypothesis H4
As previously stated, policy should
should move
toward the government and
and away from the
move toward
opposition, but divided
divided government should
should decrease the proportion
proportion of policy moves
toward the government. In
In order to compute policy moves and their direction, we comroll call votes and
and used
used
puted
Classi cation on German
German roll
puted a one-dimensional Optimal Classification
this, together with the pattern
each
and nay votes, to determine a cutpoint for each
pattern of yea and
45
vote.
The cutpoint determines the point in
vote.45
and
in policy space that separates the yes and
no votes. Figure
help us identify policy
Figure 6 offers an example of how cutpoints can help
moves. This figure
toward the government and
and away from
from oppogure shows a typical move toward
sition parties during Wahlper 12.
12.
During
–right
and CDU/CSU
12, with the FDP
FDP and
in government, the left
During Wahlper 12,
left—right
CDU/CSU in
ranking
both FDP
0C is presented
in Figure
FDP
ranking of parties produced
Figure 6. Knowing
Knowing that both
produced by OC
presented in
and CDU/CSU
bill, that all
all opposition
opposition parties voted against
in favour of the bill,
CDU/CSU voted in
the bill,
bill, and
and that the bill
bill passed, we can conclude that the policy moves toward
toward the gov46
parties.46
ernmental parties and
Similarly for all
and away from
all Wahlpers,
from the opposition
opposition parties.
we look at bills that passed
and coded whether the policy move
move was towards the
passed and
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A H L P E R 1l2
2
WAHLPER

government and
bills that
from the opposition
and away from
opposition or the reverse. We only consider bills
passed
passed for the policy moves analysis, since failed bills cannot be policy moves.
In
In this analysis, we also include only those bills
bills where the cutpoint indicates an
an
move toward either the government or the opposition
unambiguous move
opposition parties. We do
not utilise the very few votes that split the government coalition
coalition because
because we cannot
47
always determine a direction
these
cases.
We
hope
cases.47
direction of policy change in
in
hope to explore
in
more
depth
in
future
research
the
dynamics
of
coalition
disagreements
and
research
coalition
and how
in
depth in
agenda control breaks down when coalition
we
discard
coalition partners disagree. For now,
discard
now,
these moves as ambiguous from the point of view of our theory. We also exclude unanimous votes, where policy moved
moved toward
toward both
both government and
and opposition.
Table 3 presents the proportion
of
policy
moves
toward
the government for each
each
toward
proportion
Wahlper.
Overall, for Wahlpers 99-14,
–14, the proportion
toward the government
proportion of policy moves toward
is 99 per cent; in
in fact there are only two policy movements away from the governmencoalition parties out of 196
both
move opposed
tal coalition
196 policy moves. There is one policy move
opposed by both
government parties (CDU/CSU
concerned criminal
13 that concerned
(CDU/CSU and FDP) during Wahlper 13
law,
both government parties,
and Greens
SPD and
law, and one policy move
move opposed
parties, the SPD
opposed by both
during the fourteenth, on the issue of the reconstruction
reconstruction of the Palace
Palace of the Kaiser.
RESULTS
RESULTS REGARDING
REGARDING DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT

We have argued above that divided
divided government may increase government roll
roll rates
(H5), increase unanimous roll
(H6), decrease opposition
(H7), and
(H5),
roll calls (H6),
roll rates (H7),
and
opposition roll
(H8). Before
decrease policy moves toward the government (H8).
Before examining
examining the empirical
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MOVES
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toward the
Moves toward
government (%)
Moves away from the
government (%)
Total number of votes

Wahlper
9.1
9.1

Wahlper
10
10

Wahlper
11
11

Wahlper
12
12

Wahlper
13
13

Wahlper
14
14

Total

100
100

100
100

100
100

100
100

98

96

99

0

00

0O

00

2

4

11

9

33

54

30
30

47

23

196
196

evidence regarding
should note
divided govregarding these propositions,
note that the effects of divided
propositions, we should
lessened by the means through which the government overcomes
ernment may be lessened
divided government situations in
include allocation
allocation of funds to
divided
in Germany. These include
48
Bundesrat.“
Land governments, which is key for the government to buy off votes in
Land
in the Bundesrat.
Some examples are famous. In
1999, on
decision of the German
German nationality law,
on the decision
law,
In 1999,
the SPD
–Green government negotiated
– FDP government of
SPD—Green
SPD—FDP
negotiated a deal with the SPD
in the Bundesrat.
in
Rhineland-Palatinate
Rhineland—Palatinate and thereby secured
secured a majority in
Bundesrat. Similarly,
Similarly, in
reform, the government secured
secured a Bundesrat
Bundesrat majority by ‘buying
on tax reform,
July 2000, on
‘buying
off’ votes. As in
coin of the realm
realm consisted
consisted of special
in American politics,
politics, the coin
favours and
and projects.
and H7
Hypotheses
H5 and
H7
Hypotheses H5
section compares roll
roll rates during unified
and divided
uni ed and
This section
divided government. Coding
Coding occurdivided government, however,
Lander
rences of divided
however, can be problematic. The power of the Länder
in
institutional basis for divided
divided government that is
is lacking
an institutional
in the Bundesrat provides an
lacking
in
Land, not the
is the Land,
in most parliamentary regimes. The voting unit in
in the Bundesrat is
party. So, we coded
coded the composition
composition of the Bundesrat by computing
computing the number of
seats held
held by the governmental parties together as well as the number of seats held
held
by opposition parties together. The coding
Land election
election results indicates parties
coding of Land
Land level. This was a rather complicated
in
in government at the Land
complicated process because
Land
Land government coalitions may not be
be entirely identical
identical with the Bundestag
Bundestag
in a grand
coalitions, or they may be a mix of opposition
and government parties,
grand
opposition and
parties, as in
coalition
coalition of the SPD and
and CDU.
49
Following
calculations, we considered
Sturm’s49
considered a Land
Land to be
be controlled
controlled by the
Following Sturm’s
Land coalition
coalition was composed
government if
if the Land
governmental party;
composed of: (1) a single governmental
party;
(some or all); or (3) one or more
or (2) a number of governmental parties (some
more governmental
parties plus some (small) regional
have seats in
in the Bundestag;
regional party (that may not have
Bundestag; this
applies primarily to SPD
–PDS coalitions). On
SPD—PDS
On the side of the opposition, we con(l) a single
sidered as opposition-controlled
Land governments made up of: (1)
opposition—controlled those Land
50
all).50
(some or all).
opposition
opposition party;
opposition parties (some
party; or (2) a number of opposition
A party is coded
coded in
its coalition
coalition partBundesrat if
in the majority in
in the Bundesrat
if together with its
ners it holds more
more seats than the opposition
in the
opposition parties. Thus, the status of parties in
second
second chamber is a dummy variable indicating
and its coalition
coalition
indicating whether each party and
partners had
in the second
had a majority of seats in
second chamber.
(in parenthLooking
back, Table 11displays the mean
roll rates,
standard deviations (in
mean roll
Looking back,
rates, standard
eses), as well as the number of observations for each category, for government and
and
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in the Bundesrat and
opposition
hold a majority in
and when they do not.
not.
opposition parties,
parties, when they hold
in the second
in fact decrease opposition
We see that holding
second chamber does in
holding a majority in
opposition
roll rates by 15
roll rates for the
15 percentage
party roll
in the roll
percentage points. By contrast, the increase in
(from 0O to 2 per cent) when those parties do not
parties within the government is small (from
in the Bundesrat.
control a majority of votes in
Bundesrat. These results suggest that the Bundesrat
does exercise some degree of agenda power and
and that the topic deserves further study.
coalition should
should also change each
each
Changes in
in the composition
composition of the governing coalition
coalition
its
roll rate. Thus, when the CDU/CSU
and
party’s roll
–
FDP
coalition
loses
its
majority
and
is
CDU/CSU—FDP
should see a corresponding
SPD—Green
replaced
–Green coalition, we should
in
corresponding change in
replaced by the SPD
each of the four parties’ roll
PDS, which is
roll rates. Roll
Roll rates for the PDS,
is never in
ingovernment,
FDP
by contrast, should
and
FDP
increase
from
should not change. Roll
Roll rates for the CDU/CSU
and
from an
an
CDU/CSU
average of 2 per cent during
in Wahlper 14
14 when these
13 to 49 per cent in
during Wahlper 13
form the government. By contrast, the roll
roll rates for the Greens and
and
no longer form
parties no
thirteenth Wahlper to 4
from 69 per cent and
SPD go from
and 52 per cent respectively in
in the thirteenth
per cent and 2 per cent respectively in
roll rate
rate for the
in the fourteenth Wahlper. The roll
PDS,
PDS, whose status did
did not change during
remained stable between
between 71
during this period,
period, remained
per cent to 74 per cent from the thirteenth to the fourteenth Wahlper.
To test the effect of joining and leaving
in both
both chambers, we
leaving the government in
compare the classic coalition
and
FDP,
who
were
in
coalition partners –— CDU/CSU
and
FDP,
in government
CDU/CSU
10-13),
together (Wahlpers 10
–13), as well as SPD
and Greens, who were in
SPD and
in government
14). We estimate two regressions, based
together as of 1998
based on the same
1998 (Wahlper 14).
equation
equation (3):
:
ot þ
ROLL
a
ROLL RATE
RATE]-ljt ¼
1 IN GOVT BUNDESTAG
+ bB11N_GOVT_BUNDESTAG
þ
B2IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT
-1- b
2 IN GOVT BUNDESRAT þ
+ 1,8,

(3)

IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG is a dummy indicating
(3), IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG
In
In equation (3),
if the party is in
in
indicating if
IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT is a
government or out of government in
and IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT
in the Bundestag
Bundestag and
dummy indicating
is, in
if the party is in
in government (that is,
in the majority coalition) or out
indicating if
of government in
Bundesrat. Using
in the Bundesrat.
Using EBB regression,
regression, we generated
generated the results
51
in Table 4.
presented
4.51
presented in
Moving
in and out of government in
in the Bundestag
reduces the roll
roll
Moving in
Bundestag significantly
signi cantly reduces
coalition partners CDU/CSU
and
rates of the coalition
and
FDP,
although
moving
in
and
out
of
in
although
moving
FDP,
CDU/CSU
the majority in
itself, does not have
and of itself,
have a significant
on
Bundesrat, in
in the Bundesrat,
in and
signi cant effect on
CDU/CSU
and FDP
roll rates. This is largely the result of this coalition’s control
FDP roll
CDU/CSU and
over the Bundestag
Bundestag for most of the period
period under study.
If
If we run
coalition partners,
and Greens,
SPD and
run the same regression
regression for the other coalition
partners, the SPD
much higher effect of the
which are in
in government only during Wahlper 14,
14, we see a much
52
5.52
Bundesrat status change, which is
These
is shown by results presented
in Table 5.
presented in
results again suggest an
divided government.
an effect for divided

Hypothesis
H6
Hypothesis H6
We should also see more
divided govmore unanimous votes on
on major policy issues during divided
ernment. There are six unanimous votes during
examined and
and all
during the six legislatures we examined
occurred during periods of divided
divided government. Inherently consensual issues are either
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(Z score)
Coefficient
Coe icient (Z
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IN_GOVT_BUNDESTAG
IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT
IN_GOVT_BUNDESRAT
Constant
Log
likelihood
Log likelihood
Pseudo R
R22
N
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 (—9.66)
(29.66)
24.474
—4.474***
— .694 (21.85)
(-1.85)
2.694
.35 (1.21)
290.432408
90.432408
.45
32



indicates p
p,
indicates p
p,
.05; 
.01, 1–tailed
1—tailed test.
**indicates
***indicates
< .05;
< .01,

more likely to be taken up under divided
divided government, or inherently conflictual
con ictual issues
are more
be compromised
divided government.
more likely to be
compromised under divided
Hypothesis
H8
Hypothesis H8
Does divided
divided government decrease the proportion
moving towards the
proportion of policy moving
government as predicted?
proportion of policy moves toward the
predicted? Table 6 shows the proportion
divided and
uni ed government.
and unified
government during divided
During
toward the government is
is 100
100
uni ed government, the proportion
During unified
proportion of moves toward
per cent during
during the six legislative
legislative periods. This figure
gure drops to 98 per cent during
divided
is, there were only two policy moves away from the govdivided government –— that is,
and 14
and both
both occurred
occurred under divided
divided government.
ernment during
14 and
13 and
during Wahlpers 13
10-13),
Further, under centre-right CDU/CSU
Further,
–
FDP
coalitions
(Wahlpers
10–
13), governCDU/CSU—FDP
ment policy moved
–FDP and
moved rightward
and
SPD—FDP
in 99.5 per cent of cases, while when the SPD
rightward in
14), policy
SPD
–Green centre-left
and 14),
SPD—Green
centre—1eft coalitions were in
in government (Wahlpers 9 and
moved
moved leftward
should
leftward 98 per cent of the time. We expected
expected that leftist coalitions should
leftward and rightist coalitions should move
move policy leftward
move policy rightward.
rightward. This
Model, where policy change
differs from the expectations under the Floor Agenda Model,
53
points.53
should
should be determined
determined simply by the distribution
distribution of status quo points.
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Divided government

Unified
Uni ed government

98%
(99 policy moves)
(99
2%
(2 policy moves)

100%
100%
(95 policy moves)
0%
(0 policy moves)
(0

CONCLUSIONS

nd strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by
In
In this article, we find
First, the government parties have
have near-zero
government parties in
in the Bundestag.
Bundestag. First,
roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled
rolled over half the time. Second, opposition parties’ roll
median,
roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor
oor median,
while roll
in their distance from
roll rates for government parties do not respond
from
respond to changes in
all policy moves are towards the government coalition
coalition
oor median. Third, almost all
the floor
Fourth, changes
divided government. Fourth,
and the only exceptions occur during
during periods of divided
in
and opposition
roll rates and
and the
in government and
in the Bundestag
in roll
Bundestag cause changes in
opposition in
direction
direction of policy movement,
roll rates for government parties skyrocketing
movement, with roll
skyrocketing
when they fall into the opposition
opposition and vice versa for opposition parties,
parties, while policy
from being
movements go from
being nearly 100
rightward when there is a rightist gov100 per cent rightward
ernment to 100
leftward under a leftist government.
100 per cent leftward
54
These results for Germany are similar to those previously found
the
Japan,“
found in
in Japan,
55
US
and
several
other
assemblies.
Germany
conforms
to
the
‘procedural
cartel
US55
‘procedural
thesis’ we articulated
in the paper.
articulated earlier in
We have also examined
examined the effect that divided
divided government has on
on the legislative
examined
Bundesrat can
can
process. First,
we
have
examined
whether
being
in
the
majority
in
the
Bundesrat
in
in
First,
being
reduce the roll
which
are
out
of
government
in
the
Bundestag
and
roll rate of parties,
and
in
Bundestag
parties,
in the expected
found a difference in
examined whether divided
divided
expected direction. Second, we examined
government reduces the proportion
and
proportion of policy moves toward the government and
again found a difference in
in the expected
direction (not significant).
examined
signi cant). Third, we examined
expected direction
divided government and found that all the
whether voting is more consensual during
during divided
unanimous votes in
divided government.
in our dataset occur during divided
It
is worth noting
divided government might be
be greater than we
It is
noting that the effects of divided
have documented
here, as the effects may be masked
documented here,
masked by actors’ strategic behavior. For
For
instance,
in frequency under divided
instance, unanimous bills
bills increase in
divided government, presumably
because the government compromises with the coalition
coalition controlling
Bundesrat.
controlling the Bundesrat.
However,
refrain from
from introducing
However, governmental agenda setters may also strategically refrain
introducing
56
bills that cannot pass in
Such
Bundesrat.56
Such restraint would change the government’s
in the Bundesrat.
government’ s
agenda in
captured by our battery of statistics.
in a way not captured
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